| Introduction | | | | but not under uniform standards and not |
| This article summarizes my experiences in | | | | combined for review by senior management. A |
| developing a highly successful HSE (Health, Safety | | | | centralized and uniform HSE reporting system and |
| And Environmental Management) program within | | | | database was proposed. |
| PetroKazakhstan (a Canadian owned oil company) | | | | Enhance Crisis & Emergency Plans- Generally |
| which had very few HSE systems and programs | | | | the Emergency Response plans were very good |
| before I arrived. In this paper, I try to present as | | | | and complied with Kazakh law. However, PK |
| clear as possible a picture of where the | | | | lacked a corporate crisis management plan. We |
| organization, PetroKazakhstan, was when I arrived | | | | proposed that all local site emergency response |
| and what actions I took along the way to HSE | | | | plans be reviewed and updated and the workers |
| success. | | | | be trained according to these plans. Plans should |
| My Arrival: | | | | also be translated into both languages used in the |
| I had never been to Kazakhstan before or to any | | | | field, i.e., English and Russian. Hiring an experienced |
| of the Former Soviet Republics. I did research the | | | | emergency response consultant to develop a |
| country through the Internet and found that | | | | corporate Crisis Management Plan was seen as a |
| Kazakhstan was not the barren arctic waste-land | | | | logical way forward. |
| I had envisioned but rather a beautiful and diverse | | | | Revamp Incident Investigation & Prevention - |
| country with mountains and plains (called steppe) | | | | Since there were no uniform accident investigation |
| and even a portion of the Caspian Sea, the | | | | procedures or accident reporting forms, we |
| world's largest fresh water lake. PetroKazkhstan's | | | | proposed that new procedures and forms for |
| HQ was located in Almaty, a beautiful city which | | | | incident investigations be developed. Training would |
| was a blend Asian and European architecture and | | | | be provided to all safety/environmental engineers |
| culture. | | | | and supervisors on root cause analysis and the |
| My first day on the job was January 4, 2004. | | | | principles of accident investigation. |
| Like all new staff I had to meet the people, | | | | HSE System Assessment & Improvement - |
| understand the organization, and find a place to | | | | Plans were to be developed for HSE system |
| reside. I rented a nice apartment in a perfect | | | | audits which would review these 10 points on an |
| location called Samal 2. This area is near the | | | | annual basis, reporting the results to senior |
| mountains and my apartment was next door to | | | | management. |
| the RamStore, a mall with a grocery store which | | | | What did we do first? |
| made my initial experience very pleasant. I only | | | | When faced with 25-30 HSE system gaps, what |
| had only a 2 minute walk to get my necessities. | | | | would you do first? I have always fallen back on |
| The Job: | | | | my basic core belief that you prioritize based |
| My position, HSE-Director was a new position | | | | upon risk. That is what we did. For example, the |
| reporting to the President. Previously, there had | | | | refinery had no PPE (personal protective |
| been an HSE & Training Director located in | | | | equipment) requirements so we drafted a PPE |
| the Oil Field but his role was primarily related to | | | | regulation and started the procurement of PPE. At |
| training. My first task was to go to the oilfields | | | | the same time, we secured a training company to |
| and see what was going on there and to talk to | | | | come in for PPE training. The accident reporting |
| the people both in HSE and operations. | | | | and investigation system was not a reliable |
| PetroKazakhstan (PK) had 2 main operating | | | | indicator of accidents occurring in the field. Very |
| groups, one called PKKR which was the oil | | | | few contractor accidents were reported and few |
| producing side and the other called PKOP, the | | | | supervisors knew how to complete an accident |
| refinery. PK also had rail loading terminals, oil | | | | investigation form. The typical cause of an |
| storage facilities and retail petrol stations. | | | | accident was "negligence". The typical corrective |
| My Visits: | | | | action was "send the injured to the clinic". The |
| I had decided before leaving on my field visit that | | | | same accidents were repeating over and over. |
| I would: | | | | We immediately revised the accident procedure |
| Meet as many key people as possible and | | | | and forms and then implemented a training |
| hopefully persuade them to tell me about HSE in | | | | program for incident investigation. A fatal accident |
| their areas, the good, bad, and ugly. | | | | occurred in February, 2004, which steered me to |
| Visit the oil field operation sites and take a look | | | | review and update the Hot Work Permit system |
| for myself, evaluating hazards and risk measures | | | | and to start implementing Contractor HSE |
| being taken to control them. | | | | Management. Until then, contractors were on their |
| Review the company HSE policies and procedures | | | | own as to how to conduct their work. The fatal |
| Make a summary of gaps I saw and evaluate the | | | | accident changed all that. We started by issuing |
| gaps vs. industry best HSE management systems | | | | rules from senior management that all contractor |
| Our 10 point HSE plan (based upon gap analysis | | | | activities would be overseen by a local site |
| vs. industry leaders ) included: | | | | supervisor. We also changed the Permit system |
| Enhance Management HSE Leadership- We | | | | to require that local site supervisors sign and audit |
| needed to understand how Company managers | | | | the work. In the meanwhile, the Permit system |
| supervisors saw their role in HSE. We then | | | | was revised and training was provided. |
| needed to develop workshops which would | | | | On a broader scale, I knew the company needed |
| identify key HSE roles and responsibilities for | | | | to understand its risks and how to manage them. |
| managers and supervisors. Performance goals for | | | | I contracted a respected risk management firm |
| HSE would be included in management's Annual | | | | to conduct a QRA (quantitative risk assessment) |
| Performance Appraisal. | | | | and to update our Emergency Response System. |
| Incorporate Risk Management & | | | | The QRA would identify our major process and |
| Assessment - Hazard identification training should | | | | HSE risks and provide recommendations to |
| be provided for all workers as well as Introduction | | | | reduce these risks. Our Emergency Response |
| to Risk Management for all managers and | | | | System was basically limited to what the |
| supervisors. | | | | Kazakhstan government required. We needed a |
| Improve HSE Training - HSE training plans were | | | | corporate crisis management plan which would |
| not developed for each site based upon risk. New | | | | oversee and direct actions in time of major |
| training plans for workers based upon risk needed | | | | incident. |
| to be developed as well training for supervisors | | | | These necessary measures were fully endorsed |
| on how to evaluate their workers in HSE | | | | by PK senior management and they provided |
| performance. | | | | their full support in ensuring that the 10 points to |
| Develop Contractor HSE Systems - There were | | | | HSE success were put into place. |
| no Contractor HSE Management systems. | | | | Summary & Results |
| Contractor HSE Programs were identified as a | | | | By the end of the first year, every phase of |
| critical need. A suggestion was made to hire an | | | | PetroKazakhstan's HSE performance had |
| experienced HSE Contractor Specialist to get the | | | | improved significantly. The 10 elements of the PK |
| program started. | | | | HSE Safety Management System were in place |
| Develop Safety in Design - PK had relied upon | | | | with improved results in HSE, morale and |
| EPC contractors to ensure safety in design in the | | | | productivity. The keys to PK's HSE success were: |
| past. A "safety in design plan" would require | | | | - Identification of HSE gaps vs. Best Industry |
| uniform safety design procedures for all future | | | | Practice |
| EPC contracts. A key requirement would be a | | | | Development of a "Fit for purpose" HSE |
| mandated Safety in Design Plan. | | | | Management System |
| Update Operations & Maintenance Plans- | | | | Senior Management involvement and support |
| There were many gaps in operator training as | | | | Measurement of HSE gaps, evaluation of the gaps |
| well as a lack of Standard Operating Procedures | | | | with corrective actions taken |
| (SOPs) in many key job tasks. A contractor to | | | | Celebrate HSE success often |
| develop the operator training and SOPs was | | | | Note: I turned over my HSE Director role to my |
| proposed. Maintenance and integrity procedures | | | | deputy HSE Director (a local Kazakh) after the 1 |
| needed to be reviewed and updated. A proposal | | | | year assignment ended in December 2004. I left |
| for a computerized integrity maintenance system | | | | feeling confident that PK would become an |
| was suggested. | | | | industry leader in HSE. In August, 2005, the China |
| New Information & Documentation System - | | | | National Petroleum Corporation acquired |
| Several HSE reports being generated within PK | | | | PetroKazakhstan. |