| In the wake of a tragedy we are often left in a | | | | as the Director of the National Preparedness |
| state of complete and utter shock. Especially in | | | | Division of FEMA. He was appointed by President |
| events where our homes are destroyed and our | | | | Bush in 2001 to lead the United States Fire |
| loves one separated from us, our minds are the | | | | Administration and served in that capacity until |
| furthest thing from rational or clear. The | | | | 2003 when he was promoted. Former FEMA |
| unfortunate part about this fact is that it is in | | | | director Michael Brown was relieved of command |
| times like these that a clear head is the most | | | | in 2005 following much controversy surrounding |
| important thing we can have. When events such | | | | FEMA's response performance to Hurricane |
| as these happen, it is our family, friends, and | | | | Katrina, which devastated the Gulf Coast of the |
| neighbors in our communities that often come to | | | | United States in August 2005. Paulison was |
| our aid, providing relief and support where needed. | | | | selected to temporarily replace Brown and the |
| When disaster hits on a broader scale, however, | | | | position has yet to be filled. (Fournier, AP 9-12-05). |
| and it affects entire cities, counties, and states, | | | | The responsibilities of the agency, which have also |
| what happens then? Enter the Federal Emergency | | | | been adjusted a lot, are to primarily respond to |
| Management Agency. Since 1979, this | | | | United States disasters as declared by the |
| organization's efforts have played vitals roles in | | | | President. It works heavily with different |
| the lives of millions of citizens who have fallen | | | | organizations at all governmental levels, leading and |
| victim to natural disasters across the nation. With | | | | coordinating the response effort and eventually |
| almost 30 years past, and five presidents | | | | the financial assistance for the rebuilding effort. |
| overseeing this agency, it has undergone | | | | While much of its management powers have |
| reorganization and changes aimed at making it a | | | | been relocated to the Department of Homeland |
| better responsive resource for the citizens of the | | | | Security, the agency still oversees the National |
| United States in times of urgent need. Ironically | | | | Flood Insurance Program. (dhs.gov, emergency |
| enough, it is this reorganization, among many | | | | response and preparedness, 3-11) This jumbling |
| things, that have caused for this organization to | | | | and exchanging of the organizational structure and |
| fail at its primary task of responding efficiently | | | | responsibilities is credited by critics as being one of |
| and effectively in times of national crisis. | | | | the largest reasons for the failure of the agency |
| One of the worst disasters in American history is | | | | during Hurricane Katrina. (Editorial 2-16-06, |
| the San Francisco earthquake of 1906. Almost | | | | Columbus Dispatch) |
| eight hundred citizens died and over two hundred | | | | The arguments about the strengths and |
| and fifty thousand were left homeless as a result | | | | weaknesses of FEMA as an agency are tough to |
| of the earthquake and its resulting damage. | | | | make for the fact that the reorganization of the |
| (Kernell, p.77) In the aftermath of the earthquake | | | | agency has practically created a brand new |
| federal and state government officials were | | | | organization in comparison to the pre-9/11 FEMA. |
| unable to immediately communicate with San | | | | Following the enormity of Hurricane Katrina and |
| Francisco authorities regarding the damage and | | | | the terrible response to the destruction that |
| needed assistance. When word finally made it | | | | plagued the southern states, demands for |
| through, the disaster was on a scale nobody had | | | | investigations into the slow response of FEMA and |
| ever seen. Mass looting and chaos eventually led | | | | other governmental bodies including the White |
| the city's mayor and the state governor to | | | | House and the Department of Homeland Security |
| request President Roosevelt for assistance. | | | | were rampant. The agency's current positions, |
| Roosevelt's response was to use the United | | | | critics argue, leaves it with less money to fund |
| States Military and the American Red Cross as | | | | federal disaster relief efforts because of |
| well as private party support from across the | | | | increased spending on the fight on terrorism and |
| country. (Kernell, p. 78-79) The aid of these | | | | the agency's belonging to the Department of |
| institutions and people was dysfunctional and | | | | Homeland Security. Additionally, the mass |
| controversial, as no central direction was given for | | | | reorganization of twenty-two federal agencies into |
| the enormous task of coordinating all rescues, | | | | the Department of Homeland Security is often |
| relief and rebuilding efforts. The resulting lesson | | | | citied by critics as a major reason for failed relief |
| was that in times of crisis, local governments who | | | | efforts during Katrina. |
| are also often rendered inoperable, have a serious | | | | Former FEMA Director Michael Brown has been |
| need for national support in most all aspects of | | | | castigated for his agency's failure to respond |
| response. Over the next sixty years, various | | | | competently to the Gulf Coast disaster, but The |
| measures were taken to implement programs | | | | Post's investigation showed that he had been |
| and response plans into national government | | | | bitterly protesting for two years about the |
| entities in preparation for another major disaster. | | | | shifting of some of FEMA's responsibility to other |
| Multiple organizations were setup to be responsive | | | | agencies in the reorganization. In a September |
| to specific aspects of need. (fema.gov, history 3 | | | | 2003 memo to then-Homeland Security Secretary |
| 11) Although doing much better in comparison to | | | | Tom Ridge, Brown wrote that moving some of |
| the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, the federal | | | | FEMA's emergency-preparedness functions |
| government's involvement was still inefficient in | | | | elsewhere would "shatter agency morale" and |
| disaster times. In 1979, the National Governor's | | | | "break longstanding, effective and tested |
| Association urged President Jimmy Carter to | | | | relationships with states and first-responder |
| centralize the leadership of the various federal | | | | stakeholders" and could result in "an ineffective |
| organizations and programs involved in emergency | | | | and uncoordinated response" to a disaster. |
| response. (fema.gov, history 3/11) President | | | | -Editorial 2-16-06, Columbus Dispatch |
| Carter's response was Executive Order 12148. | | | | A major strength of the organization lies in its |
| This order created the Federal Emergency | | | | recognition with the citizens of the United States. |
| Management Agency (FEMA) and effectively | | | | Its well-known responsibilities given its enormous |
| consolidated the leadership of the Federal | | | | work in the last 26 years have elevated the |
| Insurance Administration, the National Fire | | | | agency to a position of leadership in times of a |
| Prevention and Control Administration, the National | | | | disaster crisis. Thus, the coordinating and |
| Weather Service Community Preparedness | | | | management of smaller agencies, governments, |
| Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of | | | | and private companies during such times is |
| the General Services Administration and the | | | | beginning to move smoother and for that reason. |
| Federal Disaster Assistance Administration | | | | Well the debate on the topic of FEMA's strengths |
| activities from Housing and Urban Development. | | | | and weaknesses is never-ending, one thing is |
| Additionally it would oversee army responsibilities | | | | clear; this agency is a relatively young one that is |
| transferred from the Defense Department's | | | | still experiencing growing pains and figuring out |
| Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. (fema.gov | | | | how to operate among mass changes and in |
| history 3/11) FEMA's abilities were tested shortly | | | | primarily chaotic times. |
| after its creation with various smaller-scale | | | | Very clearly this organization is failing. Hurricane |
| situations and the agency's inception proved to be | | | | Katrina is one of the largest disasters in our |
| beneficial. Although kinks in the organization were | | | | nation's history. Like the earthquake of 1906, |
| still being worked out, a sense of order seemed | | | | victims of that disaster were left stranded, by |
| to be brought to the local governments of areas | | | | themselves, in complete and utter shock. The |
| fallen victim to disasters. (fema.gov, history 3/11). | | | | prevailing opinion is that FEMA's response to the |
| Approximately ten years after its creation, FEMA | | | | disaster was nothing close to what it should or |
| faced its first large-scale natural disaster, ironically | | | | could have been. The real question is why is this |
| enough, in San Francisco. "The 1989 San Francisco | | | | organization failing? Evidence of streamlined |
| earthquake snapped sections of the San | | | | operations and ever-increasing performance |
| Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. The disaster | | | | quality was making itself apparent in the early 90's |
| triggered massive federal assistance and efficient | | | | and President Clinton's action of bringing the |
| disaster relief efforts, in stark contrast to the | | | | agency to cabinet level only helped that process |
| failures of volunteerism and state efforts so | | | | move forward. The response of FEMA to the |
| evident in 1906." (Kernell, p. 79) This tribute to | | | | terrorist attack of 9/11 was within minutes of the |
| efficiency and organization is largely as a result of | | | | first plane striking the tower. It played the major |
| FEMA and the efforts coordinated under its | | | | role in the distribution of the almost all of the |
| leadership and training. Only two months prior to | | | | raised funds. However, the new directive of |
| the earthquake FEMA had conducted a training | | | | President Bush to reorganize FEMA under the new |
| exercise for emergency response and | | | | DHS has proven to be the cause for failure as it |
| government officials in relation to such an | | | | has not been since before the agency's existence |
| earthquake scenario. (Kernell, p 78). This is | | | | that we have seen such a failed federal response |
| evidence of a successful direction of the | | | | to a large-scale natural disaster. Predictions of the |
| organization shortly after its implementation and a | | | | reorganization's implication on FEMA's performance |
| far superior response comparatively to the 1906 | | | | were made when former director Brown first |
| quake. The direction of FEMA following the 89' | | | | heard of the plan. According to The Washington |
| earthquake was towards building on the already | | | | Post's investigation, Brown shouted these |
| demonstrated strengths of the organization, a | | | | concerns at the top of his lungs for months prior |
| valuable asset to this country. | | | | to Katrina. Once Hurricane Katrina happened, the |
| Despite its relatively short existence, FEMA's | | | | federal government even ignored offers to help |
| structure has had a rollercoaster history. Its initial | | | | there were so disorganized (Editorial, Chicago |
| establishment as an independent regulatory | | | | Tribune) It is unfortunate that this consolidation |
| agency was eventually elevated to cabinet-level | | | | attempt is so seriously impacting the performance |
| leadership by President Clinton, only to be | | | | of the organization and the outcry for its |
| reorganized as an agency under the new | | | | reestablishment as its own agency needs to be |
| Department of Homeland Security by current | | | | considered immediately. |
| President George W. Bush in response to the | | | | Works Cited |
| terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in his | | | | Editorial Board. "Daley 'Shocked' At Federal Snub |
| Emergency Preparedness and Response | | | | of Offers to Help." Chicago Tribune 2 Sept. 2005. |
| Directorate. (dhs.gov, emergencies and disasters, | | | | ProQuest. UMD Library, Duluth, MN. 11 Mar. 2006. |
| 3-11) The current organization of the agency | | | | Editorial Board. "Fix What's Broken; Post-Hurricane |
| carries a Director (the Under-Secretary), four | | | | Reports Make Clear That Homeland Security's |
| divisions, fourteen offices, and ten regions. | | | | FEMA Setup Doesn't Work." Columbus Dispatch 16 |
| (fema.gov, structure 3-11). The Director position is | | | | Feb. 2006. ProQuest. UMD Library, Duluth, MN. 11 |
| currently vacant but acting Director is Robert | | | | Mar. 2006. |
| David Paulison, who reports directly to the | | | | "Emergencies & Disasters." Department of |
| Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff. | | | | Homeland Security. 11 Mar. 2006. |
| The four divisions, which the agency defines as | | | | Fournier, Ron. "Firefighter to Replace Brown as |
| domains of emergency management, are | | | | FEMA Chief." Associated Press 12 Sept. 2005. |
| mitigation, preparedness, recovery, and response. | | | | ProQuest. UMD Library, Duluth, MN. 11 Mar. 2006. |
| They have very distinct roles and the heads of | | | | "History." FEMA. 11 Mar. 2006 . |
| these divisions report to Interim Director Paulison. | | | | Kernell, Samuel, and Jacobson Gary. The Logic of |
| (fema.gov, structure, 3-11) (dhs.gov, dhs | | | | American Politics. 3rd ed. Washington, DC: CQ P, |
| organization, 3-11) Interim Director Paulison is a | | | | 2006. 77-79. |
| Democrat from Florida who also currently serves | | | | "Structure." FEMA. 11 Mar. 2006 . |